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STA!EMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND(D-SC) ON S.2646 BEFORE INTERNAL SECURITY SUB­
COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIARY COMMI!TEE FEBRUARY 27, 1958. 
MR. CHAIRMAN AND GENTLEMEN: 
tam pleased to have this opportunity to make a brief statement in support of 
; 
Senate Bill 2646, to limit the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
This is a matteli of pa.rt~ct1lar interest to me, because I have had a life-long 
interest in all things pertaining to the delicate balanc~ of powers existing 
between the three branches of the Federal government and between the Federal and 
State $Overnments. 
In the present instance, we are ~onfronted by an alarming trend on the part 
of the Judicial Branch of the government, headed b~ the Supreme Court, to usurp 
fieldsof · responsibility that belong elsewhere. 
Not only has the Court dealt deadly blows to the Constitutional principle of 
States Rights and to the law-making power of the Legislative Branch of the Federal 
government, but the Court has also struck at the fundamental au.thority vested in the 
Executive Bran~h • . 
The time is long past due for action by the Congress to call a halt to this 
unconstitutional seizure of power by the third branch of the government. 
We are confronted today by two methods by which. the Supreme Court is 
undermin_tcg· oonstitutt:emal .. ,geves:mnent 1c· tbie coun~ry. 
The first of these methods is through seizure of power. Although the Court 
was conceived by the framers of the Constitution to be a weaker branch than the 
Legislative and Executive Branches, the Court has consistently moved to expand its 
powers, until it threatens to be the dominating power in the government. 
Secondly, the Court has moved, perhaps unconsciously, to set itself up as 
the guardian of subversive elements, encouraging these people to continue their 
work against Constitutional government. 
Senator Jenner's bill is a particularly timely one because it throws up a 
defense for th~ Constitution against attack from both of these directions. It 
would remove from the Supreme Court some of the powers it has preempted for itself 
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and for the central government. At the same time, it would remove the protective 
cloak that the Court has thrown arQund subversives. 
In Watkins y. United States, the Court attempted to prescribe rules to 
govern the conduct of Cohgressional investigating comnittees. Note that this was, 
in the general sense, an effort to limit the po-.,er of the Legislative Branch. In 
the specific sense, by limiting the power of Committees to investigate s~bversive 
activity, it had the effect of shielding Communists. 
The same pattern may be seen in Konibsberg y. California and in Schware y. 
Board 2! ~ Examiners. The broad effect of the decisions was to ~imit the power 
of state governments to deny licenses to practice law. The specific, or narrow 
effect, was to secure law licenses for persons suspected of subversive activities. 
Again, in Nelson y. Pennsylvania, wherein the sedition laws of 42 states 
were rendered ineffective, we again find the double impact to Constitutional 
government. First, state authority was smashed down, and, simultaneously, the 
rights of suspected Communists were enlarged. 
The same is true in Slochower y. Board 2! Education, Yates y. California, 
Service y. Dulles, and a number of other cases that have come into the purview of 
this committee in its study of Senate Bill 2646. 
In most of these cases, the Supreme Court has made the error of setting 
itself up as a judge of character. The cases involved persons who may or may not 
have been Communists, subversives, or security risks. In each case, the court of 
the first instance had made this determination and the Supreme Court reversed the 
initial decision by applying its own standards. 
Now, judging character is not an easy matter. As Justice Frankfurter wrote 
in his dissenting opinion in Schware y. Board of~ Examiners, in which the Court 
tried to satisfy itself concerning the moral character of Schware: 
" ••• satisfaction of the requirement of moral character involves an 
exercise of delicate judgment on the part of those who reach a con­
clusion, having heard and seen the applicant for admission, a judgment 
of which it may be said••• that it expresses an 'intuition of 
experience which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled 
impressions; impressions which may lie beneath consciousneas without 
losing their worth.'" -2-
It is impossible for the Supreme Courh, as an appellate court, to study a 
case so thoroughly and so carefully that i~ can exercise that "delicate judgment" 
which is so essential to a proper determination of character. Even if it could, 
the fact that the lower court looks to the Supreme Court for precedents, means 
that a set of arbitrary rules must replace judgment. 
While I favor all of the provisions of the bill, I am particularly 
interested in the one that would prevent the Supreme Court from reviewing cases 
challenging the statutes and executive regulations of the States pertaining to 
subversion against the States. In the case of NelRon y. Pennsylvania, the Court 
overturned a conviction obtained under the Pennsylvania Sedition Act, which 
forbids the knowing advocacy of the overthrow of the Government of the United 
States by force and violence, by holding that it had been superseded by the 
Smith Act, a federal law forbidding the same conduct. 
In effect, the Supreme Court nullified the anti-subversion laws of 42 states 
by holding that the Federal government had preempted the field. 
Congress never intended such an effect of the Smith Act. As the three 
dissenting justices pointed out in Nelson y. Pennsylvania: 
"The Smith Act appears in Title 18 of the United States Code, and 
Section 3231 provides, 'Nothing in this Title shall be held to 
take away or impair the jurisdiction of the Courts of the several 
states under the laws thereof ••• '" 
Here is clearly another example of how central authority can needlessly 
replace local authority; in fact, it would seem, the Supreme Court holds to tl;.e 
notion that central authority necessarily excludes local authority from wha~ever 
field, of law the central authority preempts. 
This same point -- the Sedition Laws of the States -- is covered in 
another bill pending before the Judiciary Committee, Senate Bill 2401. This bill, 
one introduced by me during the First Session of this Congress, also would 
restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in reviewing the validity of 
statutes and regulations pertaining to the operation of public schools in the 
several states. It appears to me that the last stronghold of our system of local 
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into a field properly occupied by State school boards and local 
authorities, the Supreme Court has struck at the very foundation of Constitutional 
government. 
The choice we face in this country today is judicial limitation or 
judicial tyranny. 
Judicial limitation will strengthen the ramparts over which patriots have 
watched through the generations since 1776. Judicial tyranny will destroy 
Constitutional government just as surely as ~ny other type of tyra~ny. 
If the Supreme Court can assume power without rebuff, the complete tyranny 
of the Judiciary is close at hand. Then the Federal government will cease to 
be federal and become national in nature, imposing its will upon the States and 
local governments of this great country. 
The Supreme Court must be curbed. If it continues in the direction it is 
headed, we shall all become the victims of Judicial tyranny. 
END 
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